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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

CASPER DUNKEL,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 950523-CA

Priority No.

2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JTOISPICTION ANP NATTOE OF PRPCEEPINSS
This is an appeal from convictions for a violation of the
Clandestine Drug Lab Act, a first degree felony, in violation of
trtah Code Ann. § 58-37d-4 & 5 (1996) , possession or use of
lysergic acid diethylamide in a drug free zone with intent to
distribute, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-8 (1996), and carrying a concealed weapon, a class A
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504 (1995),
in the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah County,
State of Utah, the Honorable Ray M. Harding, presiding.

This

Court has jurisdiction to review this case pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (Supp. 1995).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court properly rely on the unchallenged

presentence report and a substantially complete diagnostic
evaluation in sentencing defendant to prison, rather than
ordering a third supplemental evaluation before sentencing
defendant?

"Before [the reviewing court] will overturn the

sentence given by the trial court, 'it must be clear that the
actions of the judge were so inherently unfair as to constitute

an abuse of discretion.'" State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1051
(Utah App. 1991) (citing State v. Gerrard. 584 P.2d 885, 887
(Utah 1978)).
2.

Was defendant's trial counsel ineffective because he did

not object to the presentence report or the diagnostic
evaluation?

"When . • . the claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel is raised for the first time on appeal, [the appellate
court] resolve[s] the issue as a matter of law."
Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 814 (Utah 1994).

State v.

In order to prevail on a

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
establish (1) that his counsel's performance "fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness;" and (2) that counsel's
performance prejudiced the defendant.

Id,

(citing Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2068 (1984)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
76-3-404. Presentence investigation and diagnostic
evaluation - Commitment of defendant - Sentencing
procedure.
(1)(a)(i) In felony cases where the court is of the
opinion imprisonment may be appropriate but desires
more detailed information as a basis for determining
the sentence to be imposed than has been provided by
the presentence report, the court may in its discretion
commit a convicted defendant to the custody of the
Department of Corrections for a diagnostic evaluation
for a period not exceeding 90 days,
(ii) The Department of Corrections shall conduct a
complete study and evaluation of the defendant during
that time, inquiring into matters including:
(A) the defendants previous delinquency or
criminal experience;
(B) his social background;
(C) his capabilities;
(D) his mental, emotional, and physical
health; and
(E) the rehabilitative resources or programs
which may be available to suit his needs.
(b) (i) By the expiration of the commitment period, or
by the expiration of additional commitment time the

2

court may grant, not exceeding a further period of 90
days, the defendant shall be returned to the court for
sentencing and the court, prosecutor, and the defendant
or his attorney shall be provided with a written
diagnostic evaluation report of results of the study,
including any recommendations the Department of
Corrections or the Utah State Hospital believes will be
helpful to a proper resolution of the case,
(ii) Any diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the
court is supplemental to and becomes a part of the
presentence investigation report.
(iii) After receiving the diagnostic evaluation report
and recommendations, the court shall proceed to
sentence a defendant in accordance with the sentencing
alternatives provided under Section 76-3-201.
(2) Any commitment for presentence investigation under
this section does not constitute a commitment to
prison. However, any person who is committed to prison
following proceedings under this section shall be given
credit against his sentence for the time spent in
confinement for a presentence investigation report.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Casper Dunkel, was charged with a violation of
the Clandestine Drug Lab Act, a first degree felony, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-4 & 5 (1996) (Count I), a violation of
the Illegal Tax Stamp Act, a third degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-106 (1992) (Count II), possession or use
of methamphetamine in a drug-free zone with intent to distribute,
a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-8(2) (1992) (Count III), possession or use of lysergic
acid diethylamide in a drug free zone with intent to distribute,
a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8
(1996) (Count IV), unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia in a
drug-free zone, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code
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Ann. § 58-37a-5(a) (1996) (Count VI), 1 and carrying a concealed
weapon, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-10-504 (1995) (Count VII) (R. 4-5).
Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pleaded guilty to a
violation of the Clandestine Drug Lab Act (Count I), possession
of lysergic acid diethylamide in a drug-free zone with intent to
distribute (Count IV) and carrying a concealed weapon (Count
VII), and Counts II, III and VI were dismissed (R. 36-42).
Prior to sentencing, the trial court ordered that defendant
be committed to the custody of the Department of Corrections for
a sixty-day diagnostic evaluation (R. 62; 1/27/95 h'g, T. 9). 2
On March 24, 1995, following receipt of a presentence report
and diagnostic evaluation, the trial court sentenced defendant to
the statutory terms of five-years-to-life on the two first degree
felonies and a term not to exceed one year on the class A
misdemeanor, all sentences to run concurrently (R. 64-65).3
Defendant, pro se, mistakenly appealed, to this Court (R.
68).

However, because the convictions were for first degree

felonies, the appeal was directed to the Utah Supreme Court,
which appointed the Utah County Public Defender Association to
represent defendant (R. 74). Thereafter, the supreme court
transferred the case back to this Court (R. 83).

1

Co-defendants Ethel Cindy Hall and Brenda Kinstad were
charged in the same information with an additional offense in Count
V (R. 4) .
2

The transcript of the initial sentencing hearing, held on
January 27, 1995, is attached at Addendum A.
3

The transcript of the final sentencing hearing, held on
March 24, 1995, is attached at Addendum B.
4

Following its notice to the parties of its sua sponte motion
for summary disposition and its receipt of memoranda, this Court
denied the motion.

The Court also denied defendant's motion for

a remand to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing concerning
ineffective assistance of trial counsel, pursuant to rule 23B,
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT PF THE FACTS
A presentence report (PSR) was prepared for the initial
sentencing hearing held on January 27, 1995 (1/27/95 h'g, T. 2).
The report set out defendant's lengthy criminal history, though
it lacked a notation of the criminal dispositions (PSR at 5-8)
and contained Adult Probation and Parole's (APP) recommendation
that defendant be denied probation and sentenced according to
statute (PSR at last page).

Notwithstanding the recommendation,

the trial court ordered defendant committed to the custody of the
Department of Corrections for the preparation of a sixty-day
diagnostic evaluation to determine whether any rehabilitative
program might suit defendant's needs (R. 61-62; 1/27/95 h'g, T.
9).

The court also ordered that the evaluation be provided to

the court, the county attorney and defense counsel not later than
five days before the final sentencing hearing on March 24 (R.
61) .
The diagnostic evaluation (DE) was completed on March 22 and
supplied to all parties the same day (R. 63, cover letter; R. 87
at 3).

Although Ms. Betty Davies, Director of the Diagnostic

Unit, noted that the evaluation was in some respects incomplete,
owing to the departure of defendant's case worker a week earlier
(DE 5), the evaluation touched on all the areas requested by the

5

trial court.4

In accordance with the court's order, the

evaluation updated defendant's criminal history, this time noting
that defendant had been incarcerated three times when under the
authority of the California Youth Authority (CYA) between 1969
and 1974 and that he once escaped from the CYA Institution (DE 23).

Drawing on the attached report of Rosanita Cespedes, Ph.D.,

the evaluation set out the psychological tests administered to
defendant, defendant's basic skill and intelligence levels and
abilities, his multiple chemical and alcohol dependency, his
antisocial personality disorder and his poor prognosis for
treatment (DE 3).

Ms. Davies also reported that she and the case

worker assigned to defendant conducted the thinking errors
assessment group in which defendant participated, and she
identified and reported on several of defendant's errors (DE 45).

Ms. Davies also conducted defendant's final interview,

noting that in spite of defendant's appearing sincere in his wish
to change his life and to care for his family, "changing would be
so difficult as to be nearly impossible" (DE 5).

The evaluation

noted that the Diagnostic Unit had referred defendant to the
Odyssey House treatment program, where he had been accepted, but

4

The Sixty-Day Evaluation Order stated:
1. Defendant is committed to the custody of
the Division [sic] of Corrections for a period
of sixty days, for a complete study of the
defendant during that time, inquiring into
such matters such as the defendant's previous
delinquency or criminal experience, his/her
social background, his/her capabilities,
his/her mental, emotional and physical health,
and the rehabilitative resources or programs
which may be available to suit his/her needs.

(R. 61-62) .
6

that defendant was not anxious to go, thinking that he did not
need treatment as intensive as that thought necessary by the
Diagnostic Unit (DE 6).

The evaluation concluded that based on

defendant's first degree felony convictions, his prior criminal
record, his poor prognosis for change, and the impossibility of
assuring the protection of the community, defendant should be
committed to the Utah State Prison (DE 6-7).
Defense counsel argued that he had only received the
evaluation two days earlier and that he did not consider it
complete or satisfactory in identifying available programs (R. 87
at 3-4). Defense counsel argued that defendant's case worker had
inferred that there would be representatives from various
programs available to interview defendant and because that had
not happened, the purpose of the evaluation had not been
accomplished.

Nonetheless, counsel drew the court's attention to

Dr. Cespedes' recognition that long-term inpatient treatment was
a possible option, and counsel requested that defendant be given
the opportunity to participate in the Odyssey House program (R.
87 at 5).
The trial court agreed that the purpose in sending defendant
to the Diagnostic Unit was to see if there was an appropriate
program, but that defendant's negative attitude toward the
Odyssey House program confirmed the evaluators' assessment of
defendant's poor prognosis (R. 87 at 8).

Based on the

evaluators' conclusion that defendant would not perform well at
Odyssey House, the only appropriate program for defendant, the
court sentenced defendant to prison (R. 87 at 8-9).

7

SUMMARY OF AROTMENT
POINT I
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in relying on a
satisfactory presentence report and a substantially complete
diagnostic evaluation in sentencing defendant to prison.

The

diagnostic evaluation submitted to the trial court substantially
met the prescribed statutory requirements.

The director of the

Diagnostic Unit, who wrote the evaluation, had personally
participated in one of defendant's assessment group sessions and
in his final interview.

The diagnostic evaluation was supported

by a psychological evaluation.

The presentence report, the

diagnostic evaluation and the psychological evaluation documented
at length and without equivocation that defendant was unable to
take responsibility for his actions and that he had a poor
prognosis for rehabilitation and should be sentenced to prison.
Defendant corroborated the accuracy of those reports when he
refused the Odyssey House drug treatment program.
POINT II
Defendant fails to show that his trial counsel's refusal to
object to various aspects of the presentence report and
diagnostic evaluation was unreasonable or other than trial
strategy.

Further, based on the adequacy of the diagnostic

evaluation and defendant's prior criminal record, it is apparent
that even had defendant objected as argued on appeal, it would
have had no effect on the trial court's sentencing order.

8
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POINT I
DEFENDANT FAILS TO SHOW THAT THE TRIAL COURT
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN SENTENCING DEFENDANT
BASED ON RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED IN A
SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLETE DIAGNOSTIC EVALUATION
Defendant argues that because his case worker left the
Diagnostic Unit a week before the diagnostic evaluation was
written by Ms. Davies, director of the Unit, that he received an
incomplete, unreliable ten-day evaluation, rather than the sixtyday evaluation order by the trial court.

Therefore, he claims,

the trial court abused its discretion in not ordering a
additional diagnostic period prior to the imposition of sentence.
Appellant's Br. at 7-9.
A.

The argument is without merit.

The Standard of Review

The imposition of sentence "'rests entirely

discretion

of the court,

within the limits

within

prescribed

the

by law.'"

State v. Peterson, 681 P.2d 1210, 1219 (Utah 1984) (emphasis in
original) (citation omitted).

"Before [the appellate court] will

overturn the sentence given by the trial court, 'it must be clear
that the actions of the judge were so inherently unfair as to
constitute an abuse of discretion.'"

State v. Rhodes. 818 P.2d

1048, 1051 (Utah App. 1991) (citing State v. Gerrard. 584 P.2d
885, 887 (Utah 1978).

*[T]he appellate court can properly find

abuse only if it can be said that no reasonable man would take
the view adopted by the trial court. . . . [The appellate court]
will not reverse or modify a sentence prescribed by law unless it
is clearly excessive or unless the trial court abused its
discretion."

Gerrard. 584 P.2d at 887-88.

9

"The burden of showing error is on the party who seeks to
upset the judgment."

State v. Noren, 704 P.2d 568, 571 (Utah

1985) (quoting State v. Jones. 657 P.2d 1263, 1267 (Utah 1982)).
B.

The Diagnostic Evaluation was
Substantially Complete and Reliable

The diagnostic evaluation submitted to the trial court was
substantially complete and met the prescribed statutory
requirements:
(1)(a)(i) In felony cases where the court
is of the opinion imprisonment may be
appropriate but desires more detailed
information as a basis for determining the
sentence to be imposed than has been provided
by the presentence report, the court may in
its discretion commit a convicted defendant
to the custody of the Department of
Corrections for a diagnostic evaluation for a
period not exceeding 90 days.
(ii) The Department of Corrections shall
conduct a complete study and evaluation of
the defendant during that time, inquiring
into matters including:
(A) the defendant's previous delinquency or
criminal experience;
(B) his social background;
(C) his capabilities;
(D) his mental, emotional, and physical
health; and
(E) the rehabilitative resources or programs
which may be available to suit his needs.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-404 (1995).
Notwithstanding Ms. Davies', the Unit Director, overly
generous admission that the evaluation was not complete in all
respects, the evaluation plainly addresses all of the
requirements of section 76-3-404, with the possible exception of
defendant's social background.

That component, however, was more

than amply addressed by the presentence report (PSR 9-11),
letters of defendant's family and friends sent to defendant's
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AP&P case worker which were incorporated into the presentence
report (PSR 12-19) and other letters submitted to the trial court
before sentencing (R. 47-60).
Defendant makes no suggestion about what might be missing
from the evaluation, relying only on Ms. Davies' acknowledgment
that the evaluation is incomplete in some respects because of the
departure of defendant's case worker one week before the
evaluation was submitted to the court.

From these facts

defendant argues that he obtained only a ten-day, rather than a
sixty-day, evaluation.

Appellant's Br. at 9.

The contention is

meaningless because there is no prescription that a person
committed to the Department of Corrections for a diagnostic
evaluation for a certain period of time must be continuously
evaluated over that period.

Moreover, Ms. Davies remarks in the

evaluation refute the contention.

Specifically, Ms. Davies noted

that she and defendant's Diagnostic Unit case worker had
conducted defendant's thinking errors assessment group (DE 4 ) ,
thus showing that his case worker was involved in his assessment
before his departure.

Further, Ms. Davies' participation in

defendant's assessment group and his final interview (DE 5), her
obvious review of the record and Dr. Cespedes' evaluation (DE 34, 6), her contact with defendant's wife (DE 6) and her review of
the case with the Diagnostic Unit staff (DE 7) show that she knew
defendant's case and was able to generate a substantially
complete report.
In support of his "belief" that the diagnostic evaluation
was incomplete and unreliable, defendant cites State v. Lipsky.
608 P.2d 1241, 1244, 1248 (Utah 1980), and its progeny, for the
proposition that the sentencing must be based on accurate
11

information.

Appellant's Br. at 8.

is relevant to this case.

None of the cited authority

See id. at 1248-49 (denial of due

process where trial court failed to disclose presentence report
to defendant prior to sentencing); State v. Johnson. 856 P.2d
1064, 1071-72 (Utah 1993) (sexual abuse treatment center report
which consisted solely of double and triple hearsay was
unreliable); Rhodes. 818 P.2d at 1050-51 (no abuse of discretion
in refusing probation where the defendant had sufficient
opportunity to attack the presentence report and there was ample
factual substance in the record to support the sentencing).
Even if the evaluation was deficient in some respects, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant
to prison, rather than the outpatient treatment setting he was
angling for, considering the substantial basis in the record that
defendant was a poor prospect for rehabilitation.

In State v.

Carson, the defendant also claimed that the trial court had
abused its discretion in not ordering a second ninety-day
diagnostic evaluation, which the Department of Corrections had
itself requested in order to determine if the defendant qualified
for a sexual offender program.
864 (Utah 1979).

State v. Carson. 597 P.2d 862,

Noting that under section 76-3-404 the

diagnostic evaluation was an optional tool available to, but not
binding on, the trial court, the supreme court held that the
evaluation submitted to the trial court constituted a sufficient
factual basis on which to sentence the defendant.

Id. at 864-66.

See also Rhodes. 818 P.2d at 1051-52 (sufficient factual basis to
deny probation based on the defendant's denial of responsibility,
diagnostic staff's finding the defendant a marginal candidate for
probation, the fears of the victims, the recommendations of the
12

prosecutor and the rejection by the two treatment facilities most
likely to help the defendant).
C.

The Trifrl Cwrtfrafl3 gyffjgj^t PfrgJP

On which to ggBtww* Pefenflfrnt to Prigpn
At sentencing the trial court had a presentence report and a
sixty-day evaluation, both of which concluded that defendant was
not an appropriate candidate for supervised probation in a
treatment program and that he should be sentenced to prison (PSR
20; DE 6-7). The evaluation was supported by the separate
psychological evaluation of Dr. Cespedes, which identified five
substance dependencies and found that defendant exhibited an
antisocial personality and that his prognosis in treatment was
poor (Psychological Evaluation, p. 3). The prosecutor also
concurred with the recommendations of the diagnostic evaluation
(R. 87 at 6-7) , which also noted that defendant did not qualify
for probation because of his conviction on first degree felonies
and that if the CYA escape from custody charge were included,
defendant would not qualify for anything but prison regardless of
the degree of the felonies (DE 6).
At the conclusion of the initial sentencing hearing, the
trial court was plainly disposed to sentence defendant to a
program that would suit both the community's and defendant's
needs, based on defense counsel's presentation of defendant as
caring family man seduced by drugs at an early age and the
prosecutor's acknowledgment that defendant had been "remarkably
forthcoming" with information (1/27/95 h'g at 2-9). Ultimately,
however, it was defendant that corroborated his evaluators'
consensus that he was a poor prospect for rehabilitation, and
consequently the propriety of the trial court's final sentencing
13

order, by his own conduct.

Dr. Cespedes noted that defendant

projected the appearance of an emotionally stable and predictable
individual, but that he was deceitful, immature and selfcentered, blaming others for his problems rather than accepting
responsibility for them (Psychological Evaluation at 2-3). Ms.
Davies also noted that defendant sounded sincere about wanting to
take responsibility for his life and family, but that he blamed
others for his addiction and blamed the system for not having
earlier put him into a treatment program (DE 5).

True to the

evaluators' assessments, defendant "begged" prior to sentencing
to be put on a program in order to assist his family (PSR 4), but
he rejected the demanding Odyssey House treatment program when it
was offered to him (DE 6).

As Ms. Davies astutely observed,

"Sincere or not, changing would be so difficult as to be nearly
impossible" (DE 5).

See State v. Sweat. 722 P.2d 746, 747 (Utah

1986) (per curiam) (no abuse of discretion in sentencing the
defendant to prison rather than a substance abuse program where
the evaluation team found the defendant not serious about
changing his behavior).

In sum, the trial court did not abuse

its discretion in sentencing defendant to prison, rather than
ordering an additional diagnostic evaluation.
POINT II
DEPENDANT HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT
TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE
Defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective
under Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052
(1984), in failing (1) to request an additional diagnostic
commitment to complete the evaluation, (2) to alert the trial
court to two mitigating circumstances omitted from the matrix,
14

(3) to object to having received the diagnostic evaluation only
one and one-half days before sentencing and (4) to identify other
treatment options or to allow defendant to testify about his
willingness to participate in a treatment program.
Br. at 9-12.

A.

Appellant's

The claim is unsupported by the record.

ThefregfriHstandard for Prpvi^g
Iflsffegtive Assistance <?f Counsel

In State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), the Utah
Supreme Court adopted the two-part test set out in Strickland v.
Washington 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984), in evaluating a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.5

The defendant must

first "identify the acts or omissions" which, under the
circumstances, "show that counsel's representation fell below an
Objective standard of reasonableness."

Id. at 186. This

requires a showing that counself s errors were so serious that he
was not functioning as "counsel" as guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment.

Id.

Secondly, the defendant "must show that there is

a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome."

Id. 186-87.

5

The defendant has the

The State notes in passing that Strickland dealt only with
an ineffective assistance claim in a capital sentencing: %xWe need
not consider the role of counsel in an ordinary sentencing , which
may involve informal proceedings and standardless discretion in the
sentencer, and hence may require a different approach to the
definition of constitutionally effective assistance." Id. at 686,
104 S. Ct. at 2064. The State is aware of only one Utah case,
Pflygpns v, games; 871 P.2d 516 (Utah), cert, denied. 115 S. Ct.
431 (1994), also a capital case, in which the Strickland standard
has been considered in a sentencing context.
Id. at 525-26.
However, since the question of the appropriate standard is not
directly at issue, for the purposes of this brief, the State does
not dispute the application of Strickland in this sentencing.
15

burden of proof with respect to both prongs of the Strickland
test.

Id. at 186.

"Defendant has the burden of demonstrating

that counsel's 'performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonable professional judgment,' and that counsel's actions
were not conscious trial strategy."

State v. Ellifritz. 835 P.2d

170, 174 (Utah App. 1992).
Defendant's burden is heavy:
In proving the first prong of the Strickland
test, the defendant must point to specific
instances in the record where counself s
assistance was inadequate. Strickland, 466
U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066. In so
doing, the defendant must overcome "a strong
presumption that counsel's conduct falls
within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance." Id. at 689, 104 S.
Ct. at 2065. "This court will not
second-guess trial counsel's legitimate
strategic choices, however flawed those
choices might appear in retrospect." TState
v.1 Tennyson. 850 P.2d [461], 465 [(Utah App.

1993)] (citing Strickland, 466 u.s. at 689,
104 S. Ct. at 2065; State v. Pascual, 804
P.2d 553, 556 (Utah App. 1991)).
State v. Strain. 885 P.2d 810, 814 (Utah App. 1994).
B.

Defense Counsels Performance at Sentencing
Was Reasonable and Professional

Defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective in
failing (1) to request an additional diagnostic commitment to
complete the evaluation, (2) to alert the trial court to two
mitigating circumstances omitted from the matrix, (3) to object
to having received the diagnostic evaluation only one and onehalf days before sentencing and (4) to identify other treatment
options or to allow defendant to testify about his willingness to
participate in a treatment program.

16

Appellant's Br. at 9-12.

The claim is unsupported by the record.

Addressing

defendant's claims in serial fashion, defense counsel's
performance was reasonable : (1) there was no genuine basis for
objecting to a substantially complete diagnostic evaluation,
although, in fact, defense counsel did so object (R. 87 at 3-4);
(2) although defense counsel did not specifically point out the
omissions on the matrix itself (which could not have affected
defendant's chances for probation based on his first degree
felony convictions), he pointedly brought to the court's
attention, which the court acknowledged, letters attesting that
defendant had good employment prospects and family relations and
that his imprisonment would be a significant hardship on his
family (1/27/95 h'g at 6-7); (3) there was no substantial legal
basis for requesting a continuance to challenge an evaluation
received two days before sentencing, even if the trial court had
originally ordered that the report be supplied to all parties
five days before the sentencing; and (4) considering the extent
of defendant's drug dependency, there were no treatment options
other than Odyssey House, and based on defendant's having
previously rejected that treatment option, allowing him to
testify about his willingness for treatment would have appeared
as nothing more than an exhibition of bad faith.
In fact, it is apparent that defense counsel did an
excellent job in recognizing and then responding to the way the
wind was blowing at the sentencing, a direction that defendant
himself created.

Counsel effectively downplayed the extent of

defendant's expanded criminal history, brought to light in the
diagnostic evaluation, by observing that all had parties had
recognized its extent at the initial hearing, but that the real
17

purpose of the evaluation, to locate other available programs,
had been accomplished R. 87 at 4). Notwithstanding his argument,
and recognizing the obvious force presented by the uniform
opinions of defendant's multiple evaluators, counsel wiselyencouraged the trial court to send defendant to Odyssey House (R.
87 at 5, 8). In sum, defense counsel reasonably represented
defendant at sentencing.
c.

pefenflfrnt Fails tP S E Q W ttat Be was
Prejudiced fry cpwigel'g perfpnrtfrttce

Even if the Court found that defense counsel performed
ineffectively in failing to make the various challenges and
clarifications argued on appeal, defendant's claim of ineffective
assistance would still fail under the second prong of Strickland,
which requires the defendant to show that "there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different."
466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068.

Strickland

*It is not enough for the

defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on
the outcome of the proceeding."

Id. at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2067.

Accord Codianna v. Morris. 660 P.2d 1101, 1107 (Utah 1983); Stfrte
v. Lovell. 758 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah 1988); State v. Frame. 723
P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986).

If the defendant fails to make the

required showing of either deficient performance or of sufficient
prejudice as a result of counsel's error, then defendant
ineffectiveness claim is defeated."

State v. Grueber. 776 P.2d

70, 76 (Utah App.), cert- denied, 783 P.2d 53 (Utah 1989).
Defendant merely speculates that his counsel's conduct was
deficient.

Rather, it is apparent that even if counsel had acted

in accord with defendant's argument on appeal, the trial court
18

would not have sentenced defendant differently, based on
defendant's prior record and the force and consistency with which
defendant's various evaluator's found him a poor prospect for
rehabilitation.
ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED
Based on this Court's prior development of the issues raised
in this case, the State does not request oral argument.
CQNC&TOIQN
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
convictions.

-A^

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J^>
day of April, 1996.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General
is r

/^/y

KENNETH A. BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the
foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed first-class, postage
prepaid, to Margaret P. Lindsay, Utah County Public Defenders
Assoc, attorneys for defendant, 40 South 100 West, Suite 200,
Provo, Utah 84601, this /&

day of April, 1996.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

) SENTENCING HEARING

STATE OF UTAH,

) Case No. 941400767

Plaintiff,
vs •
CASPER DUNKEL,

) Hon. Ray M. Harding

Defendant.

BE IT REMEMBERED

)

that on the 27th day of

January, 1995 this matter came on regularly for
hearing before the above-named Court.
WHEREUPON, all parties appearing and
represented by counsel, the following proceedings
were held:
A P P E A R A N C E S
FOR THE

PLAINTIFF:

CRAIG R. MADSEN, ESQ.
DEPUTY UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY
100 EAST CENTER, STE 2100^
PR0V0, UT 84606
'

JBLED
H

°V 1 3 1995

FOR THE DEFENDANT:
LEE RASMUSSEN, ESQ.
2 1 1 EAST 3 0 0

SOUTH,

G^^^P**

STE 2 1 3

UOOrf

SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111

9*@S 23
PENNY C. ABBOTT, CSR - (LIC. NO. 93)
10445 SOUTH 600 EAST - SALEM, UT 84653
PHONE: 423-1009

r \

1 II

P R O C E E D I N G S .

2
3

THE COURT:

Number 12, State of Utah

versus Dunkel.

4

MR. NADSEN:

Mr. Rasmussen I think is

5

speaking with Mr. Dunkel through the window.

6

They'll be right here.

7

THE COURT:

Okay.

This is the time set

8

for pronouncement of sentence in this matter.

9

there any legal reason why sentence should not now

10

be imposed?

11
12

MR. RASMUSSEN:

There is none. Your

Honor.

13

THE COURT:

Very well.

Any statement that

14

you would like to make prior to imposition of

15

sentence?

16

Is

MR. RASMUSSEN:

I would, Your Honor.

17

have reviewed the presentence report.

18

little disturbing to look and see all these things

19

of not available, not available, not available.

20

I

I

find it a

I took an opportunity to kind of check on

21

some of these things.

I've been able to determine

22

that a lot of these not available ones are strictly

23

from investigative stops that were made for, from

24

probation where they, in California they

25

automatically take fingerprints when they do that
PENNY C. ABBOTT, CSR
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1

and they are provided to the California Bureau of

2

Investigation and then they are automatically

3

entered in the current criminal history without a

4

disposition.

5

There's no disposition to obtain.

In

6

most of these, these were various charges that he

7

was brought back in on for checking.

8

back and just give you a flavor of them.

The first

9

one there I believe is in September of

v

He was

I could go

67.

10

only questioned in that particular matter that

11

somebody else was arrested.

12

charged in that.

13

his or boyfriend that ended up with it.

14

He was never, ever

I believe it was a girlfriend of

There are a lot of duplications of

15

charges.

In looking at his juvenile record, in

16

'68 the two failures to appear are really the same

17

ticket in August and October of '68.

18

sleeping on the beach, for being on the beach.

19

That's kind of the flavor.
I

20

This is for

find one of them here that's kind of

21

interesting.

The charges on, from the Riverside

22

County Sheriff's Office on July 29th of '76, March

23

25th of '77, June 30th of '79 and subsequently out

24

of New Orleans are all from the same central

25

focus.

They are all one particular case which was
PENNY C. ABBOTT, CSR
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1 II a

misdemeanor case.

That's why there's not

2

dispositions available.

3

fine which he had failed to pay.

4 II

And this was just simply a

As I have gone over his record I find that

5

the last conviction, the felony conviction that he

6

has was in 1977.

7

interesting things that happened in Casper's life

8

in about that particular time.

9

big change.

I think that there's some

Be seems to take a

He's been on probation for a period of

10

time then with the California Youth Authority and

11

he seems to stay pretty crime free from '77 up

12

until this particular episode, with the exception

13

of I believe he has a couple DUIs, driving under

14

the influence in there.

15

Casper in about that time of life began to

16

settle down.

17

years ago when he got married to his present wife,

18

and she's in the courtroom today.

19

married he obtained custody of his infant son from

20

a, or a two year old son at that time, from a

21

previous marriage.

22

that child now.

23

It really settled down I think 12

But when he got

Be, or his wife has adopted

They've also adopted two children who are

24

disadvantaged children.

They have a son who is

25

autistic and who has, actually had been doing very
PENNY C. ABBOTT, CSR
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1

well as long as there was funds to support him.

2

Be has currently been placed in a group home for

3

autistic children because well, Casper's not

4

working in the legal occupation of a journeyman

5

electrician, there's not funds to provide for the

6

care of this particular child and they've been

7

forced to put him in a group home.

8
9

They also adopted a disadvantaged
who was educationally disadvantaged.

daughter

Not from her

10

mental ability but because she had been, hadn't had

11

the opportunity to go to school and she was way

12

behind in her grade development.

13

grade level, performing adequately and acceptably

14

for grade level for her age.

15

was awarded from the school some meritorious thing

16

for how they have been able to help this child get

17

up to where she should be.

18

She is now up to

In fact, the family

Be'8 been basically a good family man in

19

the, you know, raising these children in a

20

substantial marriage.

21

along with his son.

22

didn't come because this is probably someplace they

23

don't need to see their dad*

24

have stayed home but his one son who is 17 now was

25

insistent on being here and he's in the courtroom

Bis wife is here today
We had asked that the children

The younger children

PENNY C. ABBOTT, CSR

1

today along with some other family members.

2

Bis wife would like to address the Court

3

but she has a heart problem and Casper has asked

4

that, he thinks that's too much stress on her.

5
6

TEE COURT:

Well, I've read her letter to

the Court--

7

MR. RASMUSSEN:

8

THE COURT:

9

Yes.

They a r e —

And I suspect she doesn't

have anything to add to that.

10

MR. RASMUSSEN:

I don't think so.

But

11

she wants you to know that even with her health

12

problem, which is a heart condition, that she is

13

prepared to demonstrate to the Court her support

14

for her husband which I think speaks something

15

well.

16

In going through this case with Mr. Madsen

17

we entered into a stipulation which I think is very

18

important.

19

stipulation.

20

that Casper really didn't know what he was doing.

21

He was probably a first time trier, trying to

22

produce methamphetamines.

23

ability to do it either with the chemicals that

24

they had or the knowledge that he had.

25

certainly did have a precursor to the development

And I'm sure the Court has read that
But that stipulation basically says

Be was, didn't have the

Be
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1

of it which fits the statute, and there's no

2

question that what he entered a plea to is a

3

violation of the law.

4

sophisticated knowledge to produce the product

5

which would be used for sale, they were off base in

6

this particular episode.

7

But as far as having the

He is a journeyman electrician.

He

8

learned that skill while he was in probation.

9

That skill has served-- Through the California

10

Youth Authority.

11

well.

12

living.

13

That skill has served him

He has been able to make a satisfactory

He has always had a problem with narcotics

14

and that problem with narcotics has escalated and

15

gotten him into deep trouble, very deep trouble at

16

this particular time.

17

some things that are alternative to prison then

18

that the AP&P has recommended that may be

19

beneficial to him and to his family and I hope to

20

society.

21

But I think that there are

He does have a lot to offer.
And I would recommend that the Court place

22

him on probation, that they put him in appropriate

23

controls, perhaps intensive supervised probation

24

and programs which can address his narcotics

25

problem and teach him those skills that when he's
PENNY C. ABBOTT, CSR
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1

depressed, that when he's stressed that he does not

2

have to turn to narcotics to satisfy or to overcome

3

these problems that he has in his life.

4

We would request that you reject the

5

recommendations of AP&P and place him on a form of

6

probation with required programs.

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. MADSEN:

9

the report.

Mr. Madsen?
Your Honor, I

have examined

I've also received information

10

through Counsel, from the time of this arrest this

11

defendant has become I think fairly remarkably

12

forthcoming with his information.

13

denied culpability and has provided a lucid account

14

of the events.

15

He has never

I have examined the situation with the

16

defendant.

I am prepared to stipulate to a

17

diagnostic, to see if the diagnostic unit can find

18

something that will meet the requirements of the

19

offense and meet the requirements of the defendant,

20

but more importantly meet the requirements of the

21

community.

22

in the county.

23

dangerous procedure and this one was being

24

attempted in the middle of an overcrowded trailer

25

park*

I can't have cooks of methamphetamine
It's a dangerous drug and it's a
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1
2

So I am prepared to stipulate to a
diagnostic report.

3

THE COURT:

I'm glad to hear that because

4

that's the Court's inclination upon review of the

5

matter.

6

of sentence at this time.

7

remanded to the custody of the Utah County Sheriff

8

to be transported to the Department of Corrections,

9

Utah State Prison for a 60-day diagnostic

All right.

I am going to stay imposition
Order the defendant

10

evaluation, for them to review his status and make

11

recommendations relative to an appropriate program

12

for his drug addiction.

13

this Court with a written report with their

14

recommendations on or before--

15

THE CLERK:

16

THE COURT:

17
18
19 II

o'clock A.M.

That he be returned to

March 24th.
The 24th of March at 8:00

Thank you f Counsel.

MR. RASMUSSEN:

Thank you, Your Honor.

WHEREUPON, the proceedings were concluded.

20
21
22
23
24
25
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1 II

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATION

2
STATE OF UTAH

)
)
)

3 ||
COUNTY OF UTAH

SS.

4
5
6 II

I, Penny C. Abbott, a Certified Shorthand

7

Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of

8

Utah, do hereby certify that I received the

9

electronically recorded tape #9514

in the matter

10

of STATE VS. DUNKEL and that I transcribed it into

11

typewriting, and that a full, true and correct

12

transcription of said hearing so recorded and

13

transcribed is set forth in the foregoing pages

14

numbered 1 through 9, inclusive and that said pages

15

constitute an accurate and complete transcript of

16

all the testimony and proceedings adduced at the

17

proceedings and contained on the tape except where

18

it is indicated that the tape recording was

19

inaudible.

20
21

WITNESS my hand and official seal this 6th day
of November, 1995

22
23
• itnnrrf1^TEpNY

C^ABBOTT,

CSR.

COULEXPIRES»44-ttoftary ( P u b l i c
jJ24-96 Commission Exp.
25 || LICENSE #93
24

L
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ADDENDUM B

1

IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT

2

UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

3
4

STATE OF UTAH,

5

Case No. 941400767

Plaintiff,

6

vs .

7

Hon.

CASPER M. DUNKEL,

8
9

SENTENCING

RAY M.

HARDING

Defendant.

ORIGINAL

1

10
11

BE IT REMEMBERED

that on the 24th day of

12

March, 1995 this matter came on for hearing before

13

the HONORABLE RAY M. HARDING, Judge of the

14

above-named court.

15

WHEREUPON, the plaintiff and defendant both

16

appearing and represented by counsel the following

17

proceedings were held:

18
19
20
21

CSR LICENSE #93

22
23
24
25
PENNY C. ABBOTT, CSR
10445 SOUTH 600 EAST
SALEM, UT. 84653

r
A P P E A R A N C E S
2
3 II FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

4 II

CRAIG MADSEN, ESQ.

5 II

DEPUTY UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY
100 EAST CENTER STE 2100
PROVO, UT 84606

6
FOR THE DEFENDANT:
7
8 ||

LEE RASMUSSEN, ESQ
211 EAST 300 SOUTH, STE 213
SALT LAKE CITY, UT. 84111

9 ~
10 ||

I-N-D-E-X

11
12
13 || STATEMENT BY DEFENSE

3, 7

14 || STATEMENT BY STATE

6

15 || JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE

8

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

25
PENNY C. ABBOTT, CSR
10445 SOUTH 600 EAST
SALEM, UT. 84653

1

P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

2

THE COURT:

#21, State of Utah versus

3

Dunkel.

This is the time set for pronouncement of

4

sentence in this matter.

5

sentence should not now be imposed?

6

MR. RASMUSSEN:

7

THE COURT:

8

Any legal reason why

There is none.

Any statement that you'd like

to make prior to the imposition of sentence?

9

MR. RASMUSSEN:

Yes, Your Honor, there

10

is.

11

read the diagnostic report.

12

the afternoon of the 22nd and went through it.

13

I'm sure that you've had the opportunity to
I received it late in

I'm actually a little discouraged with

14

this report.

15

morning, to me it's a regurgitation of the

16

presentence investigation with the one letter from,

17

or the evaluation from the psychologist there.

18

In having talked with Mr. Dunkel this

In addition, what I've learned is that

19

Paul Larsen, who was the evaluator that was

20

assigned to Mr. Dunkel, during the middle of this

21

evaluation retired or left the services.

22

know necessarily under the greatest—

23

under what cloud or even if there was a cloud but

24

he is gone and didn't find this.

25

think the Court probably, I

I don't

I don't know

Consequently I

hope the Court read

PENNY C. ABBOTT, CSR
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1

into here that this was not what I would consider a

2

complete evaluation or what I hoped to see that the

3

diagnostic unit would do down there.

4

When we left here we knew about his

5

criminal record and I think the clear intent of the

6

Court was to see if there was a program that was

7

available to him.

8

Mr. Dunkel was afforded that opportunity under

9

Ms. Davies and her writing of this report.

I don't even know that

I know

10

Mr. Larsen had made promises to, or inferences or

11

promises I guess, to Mr. Dunkel that there would be

12

people there from various programs to talk to

13

him.

14

what these people really determined, or perhaps it

15

would have the same results, I don f t know.

16

absent that I don't think we accomplished the

17

purpose that he was sent to the diagnostic unit

18

for.

That never ever occurred.

I don't know if,

But

19

There are some inaccuracies in the report,

20

none that I think would be influential to the Court

21

one way or the other.

22

like to draw to the Court's attention is that he

23

does have contact with his children including the

24

son by the previous marriage, and he has taken

25

responsibility for those types of things.

II

One that I would probably

PENNY C. ABBOTT, CSR
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1

It appears to me that, that (inaudible),

2

the Ph.D. who interviewed him did make an

3

observation that a long term intensive structured

4

in-patient program utilizing cognitive

5

restructuring in groups and individual therapy are

6

recommended.

7

recommendation but as a possible option.

8

what I thought we sent Mr. Dunkel to the prison to

9

determine, if there was an option.

10

And she's saying that not as a
That's

It appears from my reading that if that's

11

what the Court is looking for there is, they've

12

only recommended one program and that being the

13

Odyssey House in Salt Lake City.

14

think he's been short-termed a little bit on the

15

diagnostic evaluation I still think that they have

16

said that this type of program would be beneficial

17

to him if the Court felt that that was

18

appropriate.

19

that he be given that opportunity.

20

And even though I

And we would certainly recommend

He's still the strong--

I mean that we

21

know that so few people really complete this

22

program that if he's adequately motivated he's

23

going to benefit and be available to his family.

24

If he doesn't, he's not going to be present.

25

we would recommend that the Court place him in that
PENNY C. ABBOTT, CSR
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So

1

program.

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. RASMUSSEN:

4

Okay.
Did you want to say

something?

5

(Inaudible discussion with defendant?)

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. MADSEN:

Mr. Madsen?
Well, Your Honor, I think

8

that it•s somewhat of an incorrect characterization

9

to say that they didn't consider programs or didn't

10

consider other programs.

11

evaluation on this defendant and identified five

12

substance dependencies for abuse and antisocial

13

personality disorders.

14

treatment is unlikely to succeed because they know

15

(inaudible) referrals, that he was referred to

16

Odyssey House and that they did agree to accept him

17

but Mr. Dunkel is the one who is not anxious to go

18

to Odyssey House, anything that long or intensive,

19

because he doesn't think he needs that much

20

treatment.

21

than is even available at Odyssey House.

22

They did a psychological

And then they indicate

And they think he needs more treatment

And the simple fact is they did evaluate

23

him, did determine he had an intensive need for

24

treatment.

25

30 years and that his belief is he doesn't need

He admits to be an abuser for more than
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1

that much treatment, that makes him untreatable.

2 II It's not that the program won't do him any good,
3 II it's that he doesn't think he needs the program.
4

Furthermore, they said that the justice

5

requirements they believe validates prison, and

6

they even go so far as to say if they had included

7

the California Youth Authority escape from custody

8

charge, he would have not qualified for anything

9

other than prison, no matter what the degree of

10

offense has been, with his previous record.

11

I think that they have very carefully

12

evaluated this defendant.

13

programs, they've had him examined, they've had him

14

psychologically evaluated and they've made a

15

determination that he's just not treatable in the

16

current disposition, the personal disposition, his

17

personal beliefs about his problems and his

18

recognition of what needs to be done about them.

19

THE COURT:

2 0 11

MR. RASMUSSEN:

They've referred him to

Mr. Rasmussen?
Well, I don't know if we

21

just added the programs in the plural on there by

22

accident or not.

23

referred to one program.

24

situation would prefer not to go to Odyssey with

25

that recommendation.
II
II

I think that he's only been
I think all of us in this

I certainly wouldn't want to
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1

go there no matter what it accomplished.

2

that f s the type of program that they feel that

3

could help him, and our purpose in sending him was

4

finding something that could help him, maybe that's

5

where we should send him.

6

THE COURT:

Well, Counsel, I

But if

agree that

7

that was in fact the purpose of sending him for the

8

diagnostic was to see if there was an appropriate

9

program.

The evaluation clearly indicated that

10

his motivation for therapy was poor and he, I think

11

that there was a serious question about his ability

12

to perform in any program even though they

13

recommended, and as you read the recommendation I

14

think you're right, the only program that fits the

15

characterization of the evaluator would be the

16

Odyssey House.

17

recommended possibly to the Odyssey House and I

18

think his negative attitude towards that program

19

indicates that he confirms the evaluator's position

20

that he would not perform well.

21

we have the resources to waste on someone who we

22

know going in is not going to make the requisite

23

efforts.

24
25

He was then referred to or

And I don't think

It'll be the judgment and sentence of this
Court that the defendant serve a term of from five
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1

years to possibly as long as life in the Utah State

2

Prison on the first degree felony; and a term of

3

not to exceed one year in the Utah County Jail on

4

the Class A misdemeanor.

5

those terms to run concurrently.

6

remand the defendant to the custody of the

7

Department of Corrections to commence serving the

8

term as prescribed by law,

9
10
11
12

MR. NADSEN:
THE COURT:

The Court will order
Court will

Thank you, Your Honor.
Thank you, Counsel.

WHEREUPON, the proceedings were concluded.
***

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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2
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3
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COUNTY OF UTAH
4
5
I, Penny C. Abbott, a Certified Shorthand

6
7

Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of

8

Utah, do hereby certify that I received the

9

electronically recorded tape #9537 in the matter of

10

State vs. Casper M. Dunkel and that I transcribed

11

it into typewriting, and that a full, true and

12

correct transcription of said hearing so recorded

13

and transcribed is set forth in the foregoing pages

14

numbered 1 through 9, inclusive and that said pages

15

constitute an accurate and complete transcript of

16

all the testimony and proceedings adduced at the

17

proceedings and contained on the tape except where

18

it is indicated that the tape recording was

19

inaudible.
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